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This paper was partly inspired by a place : the place being Galway and the reason for 
my being there a conference at the National University of Ireland’s Galway campus 
on the subject of Critical Thinking. A subject close, we might hope, to the hearts and 
minds of all academics. Both place and conference were inspirational, a hugely 
interesting and well attended conference and a place which had once been a home to 
James Joyce’s muse, Nora Barnacle, a person to whom I will return later. 
 
The title of this paper includes the word ‘realism’ and it is this word which I wish , 
initially, to try and define. For students of literature and visual representation the word 
has long had the meaning of that movement in fiction and art which turned to the 
everyday, quotidian world for its subject matter. In literature we can recognise this 
very clearly in what has long been described as the ‘rise’ of the novel, the emergence 
in the eighteenth century of the fiction which examined the careers of both societies 
and individuals in ways specific to defined contexts and characteristics. No longer 
were heroines and heroes to be mythical figures, they were now to be those ‘ordinary’ 
characters with names such as Tom Jones or Fanny Price  who have become 
commonplace figures of western culture. This ‘realistic’ fiction tells us stories about 
various kinds of relationships ( for example, marriage, courtship or motherhood ) 
which we can all identify with. George Eliot, Elizabeth Gaskell, Charles Dickens and 
Leo Tolstoy, just a few of the great narrative realists of the nineteenth century, told us 
about worlds we either know or with which we could establish imaginative 
connections. The work of all these novelists told us tales with inherent possibilities 
about what might happen to their characters : in War and Peace we wonder if Natasha 
is going to marry Pierre, we conjecture about the possible endurance , in 
Middlemarch, of the marriage of Dorothea to Casaubon.  
 
Thus I would suggest, initially, that whilst the much used term ‘realism’ always has 
connections with the various domestic and social worlds which we know it also has, 
and would hardly be fiction or a work of the imagination if it did not, a degree of 
uncertainty and openness in its passage towards a  conclusion . Indeed, part of the  
measure of the quality of fiction is the degree to which we are convinced that the 
conclusion has been reached through the created agency of the characters rather than 
the explicit authority and control of the author. In this , realist fiction is both 
clearly’realistic’ in the sense that it can tell us , for example,about the ways in which 
people organised and conducted their daily lives , and un-realistic  in the way in 
which it can introduce elements of chance or coincidence. The less that the’unlikely’ 
occurs in fiction the more we are inclined to accept the questions which the novelist is 
asking us to consider. Jane Austen, for example, knew and demonstrated the 
temptations of the bizarre in  Northanger Abbey ; generally read as a satire on the 
gothic novel and the over-abundance of the imagination in real life  , the novel is also 
a demonstration of the part that the imagination should play in everyday life. If we 
cannot see, like Catherine Moreland, that a wooden chest might  contain something 
more than old laundry lists then we do not have the imagination either  to see 
ourselves in different kinds of human relationships or make the kind of imaginative 
leaps that make possible art, science and the construction of the material world. 
 
The ‘realism’ associated with late eighteenth and nineteenth century European fiction 
thus allowed both the recognisably realistic and a degree of imagination . The superb 
balance achieved in Austen,  Eliot et al gave us the canonical fiction which is  such a 
rich part of European culture. Yet in the twentieth century various kinds of challenges 
to realism occurred. In the old Soviet Union the early intellectual experimentation of 
the Revolution gave way to what the critic Georg Lukacs was to describe ( with a 
considerable absence of enthusiasm ) as  ‘socialist realism’. This movement, in both 
literature and the visual arts, he contrasted to ‘critical realism’ ( the great works of the 
nineteenth century ) and to the work of writers such as Virginia Woolf and James 
Joyce, whose concern was to illuminate individual subjectivity. There is a place ( as 
the art critic Andrew Hemingway has pointed out ) for re-thinking the art of socialist 
realism, not least because it gave a place in representational art to those millions of 
people who had seldom previously achieved, as either individuals or as metaphors for 
particular kinds of work , any form of recognition. (1) But this re-thinking was 
decades away from the assumptions of Lukacs and other, western, critics. Whilst 
Lukacs was as unenthusiastic about Joyce as he was about socialist realism, western 
critics hailed the work of Woolf, Joyce and Marcel Proust as ground-breaking work in 
the history of literature.  
 
What literary modernism did was to re-situate the realism of the nineteenth century in 
terms of a negotiation with  the achievements of Woolf and her contemporaries . It 
also introduced into discussions of the novel diverse traditions of the ‘realistic’ and 
the meaning of realism. In many ways a curious process of cultural osmosis took 
place in the west in which  the Soviet meaning of realism  often became part of the 
meaning of ‘realism’; to be ‘realistic came to mean both an acceptance of  the 
imagination and a determination to discuss those aspects of the social world ( class, 
sex and money ) which was often resisted. In the history of the theatre in England this 
particular construction of the ‘realistic’ was often met with a considerable degree of  
antipathy; the ‘new’ English drama of John Osborne and Shelagh Delaney was 
described with  the perjorative title ‘kitchen sink drama’ . Yet the dramatists 
themselves surely saw their work as ‘realistic’ in the more positive, nineteenth 
century sense; it might have been heretical in the 1950s to consider the links of 
sympathy between George Eliot and John Osborne but with hindsight we might 
consider that these two authors ( and others across the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries )  shared the same assumptions about the  necessary centrality of the idea of 
realism to works of the imagination. 
 
It might therefore seem, in the light of this abbreviated account of the idea of realism , 
that realism is a very complex idea and one which can bring together authors across 
time,place, class, race and gender. Realism, and the realistic, are not, therefore, ideas 
or sets of possibilities which we  should necessarily  reject or locate in terms of a 
tedious, mechanistic  reproduction of the social and personal world. But unfortunately 
for many in contemporary universities a new meaning of ‘realism’ has come to hold 
sway, a meaning which limits inquiry and is , in many ways, hostile to debate and 
discussion. This form of realism I would describe as ‘coercive realism’, the form of 
realism which insists that we can describe, absolutely and finally the social world and 
that the world in which we live is not merely ‘real’ but is also both  constant and 
fixed.  
 
 
This view, like all views of the world, has intellectual parents and it is useful to define 
certain aspects of that parentage. The first and most obvious form of the new account 
of realism is derived from the ideas surrounding the ‘fall’ of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
and the end of the old Soviet Union.  One of the many implications of this dramatic 
event was the global  normalisation of the market economy and the apparent 
naturalisation of views about the nature of the relationship of the individual to 
property and to the state. The ‘naturalisation’ of the market economy suggested that 
the given order of the social world, and that of the social relationships within it, was 
that of capitalism, a free market and the legitimacy of the pursuit of profit. It was not 
that these ideas had not been espoused before 1989, in various versions they had been 
part of many parts of the world for centuries. But post 1989,  voices in neo-liberal 
societies across the globe spoke of certain forms of economic relations in terms which 
increasingly naturalised them. The impact of this on the universities was that the 
Thatcher and Major governments in Great Britain faced little confrontation when 
suggesting that it was entirely appropriate that universities should  engage in 
‘enterprise’ and ‘entrepreneurship’.  Accordingly, from the 1980s onwards, 
universities ( and academics ) have increasingly been asked to provide evidence of 
their contribution to the economic market-place. The justification for this is that it 
would be wrong to allow universities, largely supported as they are by tax payers’ 
money, to fail to contribute to the national economy. The argument is sometimes 
difficult to resist: few people wish to be seen to be a-social ( in the sense of refusing 
to contribute to a wider society ) but at the same time questions about , let us say, the 
distribution of wealth go unanswered. A curiously ‘a -social’ thesis operates in these 
ideas : we are all expected to contribute to society but definitions of the meaning of 
that society are not welcomed. 
 
A second, and rather more diffuse, parentage of ‘coercive realism’  is the use of the 
term ‘natural’ in various social contexts. Any observer of the market place of the 
twenty first century will be familiar with the advertising claim that ‘we are all worth 
it’ ( a claim that on humanistic grounds  few of us  would refute ) and since we are all 
‘worth it’ it is ‘natural’ that we should want , let us say , expensive handbags or a re-
decoration of our home or whatever else are the consumer goods on display and for 
sale. This naturalisation of the desire for consumer goods has become so closely 
associated with constructs of ‘human nature’ that it is seldom remarked upon, but with 
it comes assumptions about the essential maintenance of economic growth and the 
entrepreneurial spirit. This spirit, which Max Weber described as  part of the ‘spirit of 
capitalism’  was crucially recognised by him as an emergent property of sixteenth 
century Calvinism. In this, Weber offered what was a social , rather than a natural, 
understanding of a view of the world. The irony is that in the twenty first century , as 
our relationship with the actual ‘natural’ world becomes increasingly problematic so 
we turn to it as the derivation of our social beliefs.  
 
The process of the naturalisation of consumer desire and the material order of the 
market economy is to be found throughout both social and intellectual life. There are 
numerous ways in which this might be demonstrated but two examples suggest 
something of the changes in understanding that are being produced. The first is that 
once we see the market economy as the norm in social life and as the ‘normal’ in 
human aspiration we implicitly make dissent from this view abnormal. Thus long, and 
diverse, traditions about, for example, trade union rights become by their very content 
oppositional. The second is that the appetite of desire for consumption is limitless : 
like a child fed only on sweets , what emerges are monsters in which desire is never 
satiated. If we put together these two examples, of what Lisa Rofel has described as 
the ‘desiring subjects’ of the market economy with the marginalisation of alternative 
normative traditions , what we confront , in terms of the students in universities , are 
people who have become used to certain kinds of largely unchallenged assumptions 
about the social world. (2) The homogeneity of much western political discourse 
makes it often difficult to suggest that the cultural and intellectual histories of the 
world are not about a seamless progression towards a global market economy but 
about  diverse and often contradictory attitudes and values. Whilst much effort has 
been devoted to the discussion, and representation of cultural difference, there 
remains a sense in which political difference has become increasingly obscured . In 
this context it is often difficult to see the way , as T.S.Eliot wrote : 
                   
               ‘…to show you something different 
                from either, 
                Your shadow at morning striding behind you 
                or your shadow at evening rising to meet you.’ (3) 
 
The question with which we are then faced, as academics, is how to show that 
something’different’ in universities. Aspects of that difference are not necessarily 
always contested ; a considerable amount of academic work in the past twenty years 
has actively re-written the curricula of many university departments : what was once 
the ‘canon’ , in disciplines across the humanities and the social sciences, has been 
disputed and found wanting. A new ‘canon’ has been instrumental in bringing to the 
academic world the study of women, of non-white people and of cultures outside the 
previous gaze of western eyes.’Difference’ has become, in many ways, an established 
part of the university curriculum. 
 
Yet for all that, and despite the manifest and remarkable changes in what is now 
studied at universities throughout the west there is an accompanying normalisation of 
other aspects of the ‘real’ world. Of this, ideas about the ‘real ‘ world and ‘being 
realistic’ are of central importance. This has led, I would suggest, to the 
‘management’ of knowledge in ways which are deemed appropriate in terms of the 
‘real’ world. The idea of the ‘real’ world of course constructs a binary division, in 
which we are asked to accept that the world of the universities, and the goals which 
we might pursue within them, are in some sense ‘unreal’. There has been for decades 
a view of the universities which argues that they are the ivory towers of the social 
world, places in which people with little understanding of the everyday produce work 
which only deepens that divide between the academy and the general population. That 
view never had any real substance. In various ways, not all of them necessarily 
positive, British universities always had close connections with the ‘real’ world . They 
produced , for example, almost all the country’s research in the  natural sciences and 
at the same time they produced generations of young people ( largely, it has to be 
said, young male people ) who were trained and educated in ways deemed appropriate 
for the administration of various sectors of both the domestic and the overseas state. 
To argue , in the light of this evidence, that universities constituted ‘ivory towers’ was 
to ignore the many crucial interventions which universities made in British social and 
political life. 
 
But the idea of the distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ world has built on 
the very flimsy sands of the idea of the ‘ivory tower’ to produce an even more rigid , 
and arguably more damaging, view of the relationship between universities and the 
wider world. In this more contemporary view, universities are asked to ‘get real’ and 
told that ‘we have to live in the real world’. This endless re-iteration of the apparent, 
and clearly firmly internalised , account of the real and the unreal ignores many of the 
empirical links that exist ( and have always existed ) between the academic world and 
the world outside. At the same time, the coercive assumption that the ‘real’ world is 
the world which should dictate the conduct of university life becomes the principle 
around which universities are increasingly organised. Thus it is all too easy for 
universities to assume ( or to be encouraged to assume ) that their priorities should 
include teaching ‘work related skills’ and assessing students in terms of their ability to 
present ideas. In these novel pedagogic agendas there exists a curious mix of both 
valuable and less valuable innovations. For example, offering various forms of 
teaching guides to students and emphasising the importance of communication is to 
provide significant assistance for many students. At the same time, an emphasis on 
‘presentation’ can over-shadow content. As many people who have attended 
‘presentations’ will know, it may very well be the case that the content of what is 
being said has little or no importance.  To offer students prepared packs of reading 
may appear to be helpful, but at the same time it might carry a message that the pack 
contains all that there is to know. The question of the subliminal message of 
contemporary aids to teaching demands a greater degree of attention than it usually 
receives. 
 
The pressures, throughout Europe, to extend recruitment in higher education has 
inevitably led to a degree of inconsistent standards throughout the sector. Differences 
in funding, and the ‘cultural capital’ not just of individuals, but also of institutions, 
can ( and does) make a significant difference to the quality of higher education. But 
here a second aspect of the question of the  ‘real world’ intrudes, in that the 
universities where the ‘real’ world is likely to be the most visible are generally those 
universities with the least in the way of resources. For ancient and long established 
universities ( in Britain Oxbridge and the old civic universities ) the ‘real’ world, of 
economic scarcity, a  student body with various forms of social disadvantage  and the 
pressure to accord with government demands  can be resisted through various ways, 
not least the degrees of financial  independence and significant social status which 
those institutions possess. Hence the ‘real’ world, of the constant need to accord with 
government strictures makes less impact in these institutions. The inevitable paradox 
is that the very democratisation of higher education which its expansion was designed 
to ensure is lessened by the impact of academically detrimental  policies which can be 
more easily resisted by the privileged than by others. For example, in England there 
has been a pattern in which higher status universities or university colleges  ( for 
example Oxbridge and the London School of Economics ) have been able to resist the 
most obvious interventions by the QAA in the pattern of teaching and the explicit 
collusion with the demands of the labour market. A further paradox which is also 
apparent here is that these very higher status universities are those institutions whose 
graduates are more widely welcomed  in the labour market. It would appear that the 
‘real’ world does not extend a particularly warm hand of welcome to those educated 
in terms of the ‘real’ world. 
 
Collusion with the apparent aspirations of the  ‘real’ world does not, it would seem, 
always reward those who most energetically pursue that path. In this we come to 
another aspect of the question of the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ worlds. It is that this 
distinction fails to recognise the great complexity of the process of learning and the 
idea of ‘knowledge’ which underpins it. By its very nature academic teaching and 
research is open-ended and always , and certainly at its very best, a way of looking at 
and studying the world which allows as much for what we do not know as we do. 
Ambiguity, doubt, dissent, disorder are valuable and central tenets of the academic 
process: how else, we might ask rhetorically, should we ever learn to question and to 
think critically about what we know. To abandon this account of ‘the getting of 
wisdom’ in favour of a template which speaks of ‘learning objectives ‘ is to endorse a 
form of inquiry which has all the hallmarks of those authoritarian regimes ( whether 
of the past or the present ) when there was only one way to ‘know’. The case of 
science in the old Soviet Union is the dramatic example of this kind of approach to 
knowledge : the refusal to allow scepticism made it very difficult, if not impossible, 
for advances to be made. 
 
 
The over-management of knowledge, and an over-management which is legitimated 
in terms of its value for the ‘real’ world, thus fails to do two things . First of all it 
entirely fails to distinguish between information, knowledge and wisdom. The world 
of the twenty first century is one which for many people is information rich : the inter-
net gives many of us rapid access to enormous amounts of material. But we have to 
continue to recognise the distinctions between information and knowledge. We do not 
have to disallow information but what is essential is learning , and being taught, that 
what we have to take to this information is the ability to consider and assess it. The 
second issue about the over-management of knowledge is that it refuses the 
contradictions and the ambiguities , the incoherence and the chaos of both the social 
and the intellectual world. In  ‘managing’ knowledge, and formatting it  in ways 
which make it easy to assimilate and process, we can often avoid the recognition of 
the ways in which ideas are not always part of  ordered patterns or those binary forms 
of ‘for’ and ‘against’. In narrative fiction in the nineteenth century bourgeois realism 
opened the eyes of many to the cruelties and injustices of the social world. The 
bourgeois ‘realism’ of the twenty first century is often more inclined to secure 
agreement and the authority of the conventional than it is to consider what might be 
difficult or uncomfortable.  
 
 
The present seizing of the idea of ‘realism ‘ for purposes that many of us might 
question should not, however, encourage us to abandon the term. There is , 
notwithstanding the best efforts of various state agencies to persuade us that the ‘real’ 
can be easily defined, what might be described as a ‘real’ realism. This realism , 
rather than engaging with some of the fanciful aspects of constructions of the world, 
recognises some of the ‘real’ realities of the world, a world in which , for example, 
access to clean water constitutes a major source of global inequality. Other ‘real’ 
aspects of the world which we might consider include the capacity of the employment 
market to absorb large numbers of graduates or the relationship between the financial 
cost of higher education with individual financial gains from it. Even more ‘real’, in 
2009, is the question , and the implications, of the health of consumer spending in 
relation to general social prosperity.  
 
All these three questions constitute ‘real’ questions and they can be substantiated in 
terms of evidence and the experience of everyday lives. The answers to these 
questions suggests that one of the great challenges which we face in the twenty first 
century is learning to distinguish between various forms of ‘realism’, the one which 
offers a constructed and questionable account of the purposes of education and the 
other which defines precisely those conditions of ‘reality’ which are too often over-
looked.  In the early years of the twentieth century James Joyce was inspired to write 
his great novel Ulysses by the presence of his muse, Nora Barnacle, a woman who 
lived an ‘ordinary’, otherwise unexceptional life in Galway. Joyce did not , therefore, 
look to a fantasy version of womanhood, or fictional women, for his inspiration. This 
example, of the meeting of  the everyday and the extraordinary ,offers us important 
ways of defining our relationship with the ‘real’. Joyce did not look at , or think about 
Nora Barnacle in terms of attempting to render a precise picture of a human being. On 
the contrary, he looked at the ‘real’ in order to find ways of thinking about what might 
be, what could be, and what was possible. Rather than turning to the existent social 
world in order to curtail the imagination he used it as a place from which to construct 
possibility. In this we can see something of the way in which we might both resist 
homogenising versions of the ‘real’ and turn instead to those accounts which allow us 
to develop the visions and the varieties of human intelligence. 
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